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I. Introduction
If you were to ask Georgia's agricultural water users about the security of their right to use
water, you would find that the conventional wisdom among these users is that their water
rights are secure. While some agricultural water users may gripe about the additional
hassle caused by recent changes to Georgia's water law, most users likely believe that these
changes have not impacted the security of their water rights. In fact, a substantial number
of these users may even hold the view that because the state has issued them a use permit,
the changes to the law have, if anything, increased the security of their water rights.
Those who follow Georgia water law closely, however, would likely characterize the changes
made over the past two decades quite differently. A close examination of Georgia's water
law indicates that considerable confusion and uncertainty have been introduced into the
legal regime, particularly in the case of the thirsty Flint River Basin. The changes have
complicated water rights at a time when pressure on Georgia's water resources is growing,
increasing the need for certainty.
This article takes a closer look at some of the changes made to Georgia water law, focusing
on how these changes impact the Flint River Basin. This survey paints a picture of laws
that are often ambiguous, confusing, and fraught with uncertainty. The central question
raised is whether the tenure of an agricultural user's permit correlates with the security of
that water user's claim to water. The perception of many agricultural water users,
particularly those with grandfathered permits, is that tenure is highly correlated with the
security of the water right, with the first round of permitting (for uses initiated prior to
July 1, 1988) seen as the most secure and the later rounds of permitting seen as
increasingly tenuous.
1 An earlier version of this article was published by the Georgia Water Planning and Policy Center as
Water Policy Working Paper 2007-001 and is available at
http)://www.h2opolicycenter.org/pdf documents/water workingpapersWP2007-001 final.pdf (last
visited June 30, 2009).
2 Mark Masters is the Director of Albany State University's Flint River Water Planning and Policy
Center. Ronald Cummings and Brigham Daniels are consultants with the Flint River Water
Planning and Policy Center. Kristin Rowles is a policy analyst for the Georgia Water Planning and
Policy Center. Douglas Wilson is the Executive Director of the Georgia Water Planning and Policy
Center.
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A casual reading of Georgia law seems to harmonize with the agricultural water users' lay
understanding. Legislation enacted by the Georgia General Assembly in 1988, 2003, and
2006, in essence, creates different "classes" of agricultural water use permits. In 1988, the
General Assembly placed farmers who had acquired their water use permits based on use
prior to July 1, 1988 and submitted applications to the Georgia Environmental Protection
Division (EPD) prior to July 1, 1991 into a distinct tenure from subsequent permittees. 3
These permits are commonly known as "grandfathered" permits, but we refer to them as
"Tenure 1" permits. There are some major distinctions between Tenure 1 and subsequent
permits. First, Tenure 1 permits were granted by EPD on the basis of a user's equipment
capacity, as opposed to the reasonable use criteria applied to subsequent tenures of
permits. 4 However, as discussed below, the meaningfulness of this distinction is unclear
and even problematic. Second, in the Flint River Basin, all Tenure 1 permit holders qualify
to participate in the drought abatement program created by the Flint River Drought
Protection Act. 5
A second class of permits, which we refer to as "Tenure 2," are permits based on use
initiated after July 1, 1988 and on applications submitted to the EPD prior to December 1,
1999. The only difference between Tenure 2 and Tenure 1 permits is that limits to water
use under a Tenure 2 permit are based on a "reasonableness" criterion, a multifactor
weighing test left largely to the EPD's discretion. 6 In the Flint River Basin, Tenure 2 permit
holders, like Tenure 1 permit holders, are eligible to participate in the drought abatement
program created by the Flint River Drought Protection Act.7
A moratorium on the issuance of new agricultural water use permits between December 1,
1999 and March 20, 2006 created a third class of permits. During the moratorium period,
the EPD received 1,134 permit applications for water use involving the irrigation of
approximately 96,219 acres. 8 The EPD has been reviewing and processing the backlog
applications since the moratorium was lifted. Legislative amendments to Georgia's water
3 It is important to note that, particularly for Georgia's groundwater users, it is not entirely clear
what the actual limits of their rights were prior to 1988. In some instances, it appears that Georgia
groundwater users had absolute dominion over their groundwater resources, limited only by their
ability to get it out of the ground. In other instances, particularly in the case of a strong hydrological
connection between groundwater and surface water, it appears that groundwater users were limited
by a reasonableness standard. This issue is discussed in further detail in the Appendix to RONALD
CUMMINGS, ET AL., MANAGING AGRICULTURAL WATER USE DURING DROUGHT: AN ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPARY POLICIES GOVERNING GEORGIA'S FLINT RIVER BASIN, Water Policy Working Paper 2007-
001 (2007) available at
httnp://www.h2opolicycenter.org/df documents/water workingvapersWP2007-001 final.ndf . This
may prove quite important in future litigation because it could alter how a reviewing court treats
grandfathered permit holders.
4 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a)(3) (surface water); § 12-5-105(a) (groundwater).
5 Id. § 12-5-31(h) (surface water); § 12-5-97(a) (groundwater). The details of the Flint River Drought
Protection Act are addressed in Section IV.
6 Id. § 12-5-31(e)-(g) (surface water); § 12-5-96(d) (groundwater).
7 Id. § 12-5-31(h) (surface water); § 12-5-97(a) (groundwater).
8 GA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION, FLINT RIVER REGIONAL WATER
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION PLAN, 33, 41 (Mar. 20, 2006), available at
httnp://wwwl.gadnr.org/frbp/Assets/Documents/Plan22.ndf (last visited June 30, 2009).
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laws adopted during the moratorium period affect all backlog permits equally, regardless of
the date of the application.
Three such amendments are of particular interest. First, participation in the Flint River
Drought Protection Act's acreage reduction program (a voluntary program providing
financial incentives to farmers who agree not to irrigate) is denied to all permit holders
with applications submitted to the EPD after December 1, 1999. Second, for all permits
issued after July 1, 2003, an amendment provided that permit holders may not use water
until a state-approved water meter is installed on permitted pumps. 9 This provision does
not distinguish between the application submission date and the permit issuance date, but
it is reasonable to assume that it applies to all backlog permits since all are issued after
July 1, 2003.10 Additionally, groundwater users who receive backlog permits have a special
obligation to file annual reports documenting their water use to the state.1 1
As an aside, there is an additional distinction between backlog permits and Tenure 1 and 2
permits which should be kept in mind in later discussions of how permits are treated
during drought. Tenure 1 and 2 permits were issued with little or no consideration given as
to the location of the proposed withdrawal. In considering backlog applications, however,
the EPD plans to give considerable attention to the locations of proposed withdrawals,
especially in sub-areas that are considered "vulnerable" to low flow conditions during
drought. 12 Thus, EPD may in the future deny some backlog permit applications that would
have been approved had they been submitted prior to December 1, 1999.
A third legislative amendment makes a distinction between backlog permits with
applications submitted to the EPD before and after December 31, 2002. For permit holders
that submitted applications to the EPD after December 31, 2002, the permit holder must
pay the costs for the required water use meter. Thus, we divide backlog permits into two
Tenure classes. Tenure 3 permits are those backlog permits for which applications were
received by the EPD prior to December 31, 2002 and, therefore, not subject to the meter
payment requirement. Tenure 4 permits are backlog permits where applications were
received by the EPD after December 31, 2003 and permit holders must pay for their meters.
The final class of permits, Tenure 5, are those for which applications were submitted after
March 20, 2006. In addition to all the restrictions imposed on Tenure 4 permit holders,
Tenure 5 permits are subject to a 25-year term and a permit application fee. 13 In addition,
the EPD may revoke Tenure 5 permits if use does not begin within two years of the user
receiving the permit. 14
9 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(m.1)(2)(D).
10 It is not clear how this provision will be enforced. It would be very difficult to determine if a well
has been used before a meter is installed. Moreover, the code is silent as to what agency has
enforcement responsibility for this provision - the EPD or the Georgia Soil and Water Conservation
Commission, which coordinates the well meter program.
11 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-105(b).
12 Flint River Plan, supra note 8, at § I.B.
13 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a)(3) (surface water); § 12-5-105(a) (groundwater).
14 Id. § 12-5-31(k)(6.1) (surface water); § 12-5-105(b)(2) (groundwater).
Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2009) 25
The major conditions imposed on permits with different "tenures" are presented below in
Table 1. After reviewing the information in Table 1, it becomes clear that Tenure 1 permit
holders are given preferential treatment in terms of all permit characteristics. Additionally,
the later a permit is received, the more encumbered a permit becomes.
Table 1: Permit Characteristics of Different Permit Tenures*
Tenure 1 Tenure 2 Tenure 3 Tenure 4 Tenure 5
Pre-7/1/88 7/1/88 - 12/1/99 - 12/31/02 - Post-4/20/06
12/1/99 12/31/02 4/20/06
Standard used for Pumping Reasonable Reasonable Reasonable Reasonable
EPD's permitting capacity use use use use
decision
Annual reporting Surface: No Surface: No Surface: No
required No No GW: Yes GW: Yes GW: Yes
May be required to
pay for meter No No No Yes Yes
Can initiate use
prior to meter
installation Yes Yes No No No
$250 application
fee No No No No Yes
25-year term on
permit No No No No Yes
Yes, if initial
Permit revocable use doesn't
for non-use begin within 2
No No No No years
Qualifies for Flint
River Basin
Drought
Protection Act's Yes Yes No No No
program
* Dates refer to date application received by the EPD.
While in many respects a permit's tenure seems to control the degree to which a permittee
is restricted, the discussion that follows illustrates that the clear lines seemingly drawn by
the law may evaporate when scarcity sets in, the very time that water users desire
certainty the most. This looming uncertainty is highlighted by focusing on two questions of
central importance:
Question 1: Can the EPD modify, revoke, or in any way alter water use permits
during periods of drought?
Question 2: Does the tenure of a permit affect the permit holder's vulnerability to
any such modifica tion or revocation?
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A close examination of three sets of laws and regulations is necessary to put these questions
in proper perspective. Thus, Section II begins with an overview of relevant sections of
existing laws, other than the Flint River Drought Protection Act, which is discussed
separately in Section IV. Section III examines EPD policies, especially those associated
with the agency's recently completed Flint River Basin Regional Water Development and
Conservation Plan. Section IV describes pertinent provisions of the Flint River Drought
Protection Act, with particular attention given to the EPD's rules for implementing the
irrigation-reduction auction. Concluding remarks are offered in Section V, wherein
suggestions are offered for alternative means by which the state might design an equitable
method for reducing agricultural water use during periods of drought.
II. Implications of Georgia Water Law for the "Status" of Permits
This section focuses on the laws that govern the EPD's ability to reduce agricultural water
use in times of drought or other circumstances that lead to water scarcity. In doing so,
however, this section does not consider instances in which a drought has been declared by
the EPD and thereby activated the Flint River Drought Protection Act. That act will be
discussed in detail in Section IV. Rather, this section attempts to answer the two questions
described above, under conditions when the Drought Protection Act is not invoked. First,
can the state modify or revoke an agricultural water use permit? Second, if so, does the
tenure status of a permit matter in any such action?
As explained above, many of Georgia's agricultural water users may believe that EPD has
no such power and that the more senior the tenure of a permit, the more secure the permit
holder's water rights are. And in fact, a review of Georgia's water law produces very few
code provisions that contradict this perception. However, as discussed below, at least one
code provision regarding surface water permits and a similar provision regarding
groundwater permits appears to allow the EPD to modify and revoke water use permits.
These code provisions provide such a substantial loophole that they cast a great deal of
uncertainty onto the security of existing users' water rights.
Before turning to the issue of the EPD's power to modify and revoke permits to make way
for new permittees, it is important to note that the legislature has provided the EPD the
power to revisit permits to protect the health and safety of Georgians or otherwise respond
in times of crisis or emergency. In the context of surface water, for example, the Georgia
Code gives the director of the EPD the power to "revoke, suspend, or modify a permit for
any other good cause consistent with the health and safety of the citizens of this state."15
Similarly, the legislature has provided the EPD some power to restrict use during times of
emergency. 16 While the purpose of these exceptions is understandable, the lack of clarity
about what exactly the EPD should do is somewhat troubling for those seeking more
certainty about water rights. For example, how specifically should the agency modify or
revoke rights once it has found that water use threatens the public health or that an
emergency is looming? It is unclear how a permit holder's tenure plays into the probability
that the EPD will ask any particular user to cut back when the agency uses its authority
provided by either of these provisions.
15 Id. § 12-5-31(k)(8).
16 Id. § 12-5-31(1).
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However, as alluded to above, the General Assembly has created a much more substantial
loophole. With respect to surface water, the EPD Director "may suspend or modify a farm
use permit if he should determine through inspection, investigation, or otherwise that the
quantity of water allowed under the permit would prevent other applicants from reasonable
use of surface waters for farm use."17 A very similar provision is found in the context of
Georgia's groundwater law. 18 Taken literally, these provisions of the code appear to give the
Director the power to revoke, suspend, or modify any existing farm use permit in order to
"make room" for new applicants seeking permits to exercise their riparian rights. In
isolation, these provisions seem to make a permit holder's tenure irrelevant. Perhaps
equally troubling for Georgia water users seeking security in their water rights is that the
code is silent as to how the EPD should implement this provision.
To appreciate the implications of this provision in the code, consider the following
hypothetical example. Suppose there are three farmers with water use permits within a
given watershed. Acreage irrigated by each and the date at which the permit was acquired
are as follows:
Farmer A (1988) 3,000 acres
Farmer B (1998) 1,000 acres
Farmer C (2006) 2,000 acres
The water use by Farmers A, B, and C exhausts water supplies in the watershed, especially
during drought. Farmer D, a riparian owner in the watershed, wishes to initiate the
irrigation of 3,000 acres. Because the three farmers are using all the available water, the
EPD Director would have to conclude that use by Farmers A, B, and C prevents this "other
applicant" from reasonable use of available surface waters. Can the Director suspend or
modify the exist permits to allow a new applicant reasonable use of the surface waters? The
answer depends on the intent of the Georgia General Assembly and whether other legal
safeguards are intended to govern the EPD decision.
With respect to legislative intent, how should the EPD evaluate "reasonable use" for new
permit applications, such as Farmer D's? Is the application by Farmer D for 3,000 new
acres "reasonable"? And, if not, what constitutes a "reasonable" request? From the
perspective of existing water users, understanding what uses are reasonable is important
because it would allow them to at least venture a guess as to whether their existing rights
to use water are vulnerable to applications submitted by prospective rival users.
As one might suspect, grasping for hard and fast rules when weighing reasonableness is
difficult because it is context-specific. In fact, the Georgia legislature did not even attempt
to draw a clear line that can help users make reliable forecasts about how "reasonable" a
use is. Rather, in determining what constitutes a "reasonable" request, the Georgia
legislature relies on a multi-factor approach that includes a broad range of categories.
Examples of these categories illustrate their diversity. The legislature instructed the EPD
to consider, among other things, the number of users of the water resource; the physical
17 Id. § 12-5-31(k)(7) (emphasis added).
18 See id. § 12-5-105(b)(3).
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limits of the resource; the value of proposed use; and, the all-encompassing varying
circumstances of each case.19 This broad and open analysis should make incumbent water
users feel at least somewhat vulnerable that somewhere down the road some prospective
user will find a way to trump the rights of some existing users, possibly himself included.
What happens if the EPD deems a request by a new user to be "reasonable." For example,
in our hypothetical, if the EPD allots water to Farmer D, who then among Farmers A, B,
and C, gives up water, by how much, and why? Does the EPD apply the same criteria to
exiting water users as it does to the new user when it considers making room for other
users? Does the permit tenure of existing users matter in this analysis? Do Tenure 1
permits receive any protections against the threat of future users? Or, are all users treated
equally?
For example, if the EPD grants Farmer D water for 3,000 acres, which over-allocates the
watershed, does each farmer (A, B, and C) give up equal shares of 1,000 acres? In that
scenario, Farmer B would be out of business. Alternatively, do Farmers A, B, and C give up
acreage that is proportional to their existing share (A gives up 50%; B gives up 16.6%; C
gives up 33.3%)? Finally, does tenure matter and if so, how much? For instance, do D's
needs require that Farmers B and C go out of business, leaving Farmer A, the senior permit
holder, unaffected? Or, is there no magic formula and instead the EPD has great latitude to
make decisions about who gives up what?
Admittedly, this hypothetical example was designed to simplify how some alternative
scenarios might play out. However, the importance of the questions raised by this
hypothetical is only amplified by the numerous potential water users found in most of
Georgia's water basins. The dismal, yet increasingly foreseeable, situation characterized
above leaves existing permit holders facing enormous uncertainty as to the long-term
security of their rights to use water. This uncertainty exists even if an irrigator holds a
Tenure 1 permit to irrigate lands the way he has for decades.
As unpredictable as the law governing the EPD's ability to modify and revoke existing
permits seems, the uncertainty of the law is only compounded when read in relation to
other statutory provisions. Arguably, other provisions of the code pertaining to the EPD's
authority to issue new permits appear to undercut some of the force of the EPD's ability to
modify or revoke existing permits. For example, in evaluating what constitutes a
reasonable use, the EPD must also consider factors that point in the direction of protecting
existing users. For example, in consideration of new permits for agricultural water users,
the EPD must weigh "the extent of any injury or detriment caused or expected to be caused
to other water users,"20 "the prior investments of any persons in lands, '2 1 and in the case of
surface water, the EPD must heed the mandate that "granting of [a new] permit shall not
have unreasonably adverse effects upon other water uses in the area, including potential as
well as present use. ' 22
19 Id. § 12-5-31(e)-(g) (surface water); § 12-5-96(d) (groundwater).
20 Id. § 12-5-31(e)(7) (surface water); § 12-5-96(d)(7) (groundwater).
21 Id. § 12-5-31(e)(9) (surface water).
22 Id.
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Similarly, another section of the Georgia Code provides that EPD "shall take into
consideration the extent to which any withdrawals... are reasonably necessary... to meet
the applicant's needs and shall grant a permit which shall meet those reasonable needs;
provided, however, that the granting of such permit shall not have unreasonably adverse
effects upon other water uses in the area.'23
The code provision that perhaps most challenges the notion that the EPD could modify or
revoke existing permits is the following: "In the event two or more competing applicants or
users qualify equally [under the Code's reasonability criteria] .. .the director is authorized
to grant permits to applicants or modify the existing permits of users ... on a prorated or
other reasonable basis .. .; provided, however, the director shall give preference to an
existing use over an initial applicant.' 24 Viewed in isolation, this section seemingly leads to
the conclusion that the EPD cannot make room for other prospective users.
So, at least in isolation, these provisions of the Georgia Code create a confusing and
seemingly contradictory picture. In fact, the state of the law may seem so blurry that water
users may be tempted to throw up their hands at this point. Unfortunately, neither the
EPD attempting to administer the law nor the courts attempting to interpret it have the
luxury of walking away from the law just because it is confusing.
All is not lost, however. The legislature has made clear that in interpreting its statutes, one
should "look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. ' 25 One method for doing
so, particularly when the law is confusing, is to "attempt to gather the legislative intent
from the statute as a whole. ' 26 The goal, in this context, is to make the seemingly
contradictory laws "harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part. '27
Given the lack of agency decisions and court rulings, one can only speculate regarding how
the seemingly contradictory statutory commands discussed above may be interpreted in the
future. However, a reasoned guess is possible. While the most sensible reading of Georgia
water law suggests that that law conflicts with itself and does not make much sense, the
EPD and any reviewing court have to find a way to harmonize the laws passed by the
legislature, if possible. Thus, these contradictory commands should be parsed to assure that
each of the provisions remains true to the admittedly vague principle of "reasonableness"
that Georgia water law embraces. 28 When the principle of reasonableness is kept in mind,
the legislature seems to be requiring that the EPD make room for new users to the extent
that it is reasonable, with part of this analysis requiring that, all else being equal, the EPD
give preference to existing users.
Given this reading of the law, it appears that in determining whether a new user can
supplant an existing user, the General Assembly gave the EPD a great deal of discretion to
23 Id. § 12-5-31(g) (surface water) (emphasis added).
24 Id. § 2-5-31(f) (surface water) (emphasis added).
25 Id. § 1-3-1.
26 Sikes v. State, 268 Ga. 19 (1997).
27 Footstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Ga. 448, 453 (2006) (citing Vollrath v. Collins, 272 Ga.
601, 603-604 (2000)).
28 For a more detailed analysis, see Cummings, supra note 3, at Appendix A.
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make judgment calls. Indeed, it is customary in Georgia to give great weight to the
interpretation adopted by the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute,
when the agency's interpretation "reflects the meaning of the statute and comports with
legislative intent. ' 29 Because the legislature provided a great number of factors for the EPD
to weigh with little instruction of how much weight to give each factor, the legislature left
the EPD a lot of room to chart the course for Georgia water law. The lack of guidance,
however, only adds to the uncertainty facing Georgia farmers holding agricultural water
use permits.
Returning to the two questions posed earlier, much uncertainty exists about the extent to
which the EPD can and will make room for future users at the expense of present water
users. With regards to the status of permits and the relevance of tenure, whether in a
drought or not, only ambiguous answers can be gleaned from the Georgia code. Some
sections suggest water rights are stable, while others suggest rights can be modified. EPD
appears to have the authority to determine tradeoffs in allocation, so long as it at least
considers each of the factors dictated by the legislature. Nothing in the code, however,
suggests that holders of Tenure 1 permits have any sort of preferred status vis-A-vis later
tenured permits in the event that the EPD wishes to reduce agricultural water use during a
period of drought or issue new permits.
This observation contradicts the belief of many water users that Georgia water law
somehow protects Tenure 1 permits. While permit holders of other tenures bear more
burdens in applying for and maintaining their permits, nothing in the code would
seemingly justify the notion that Tenure 1 permits are protected from modification as the
EPD makes allocation decisions when addressing drought conditions. 30
It can be argued that the ambiguities and inconsistencies noted above reflect gaps in the
state's water laws as they relate to the notion of riparian rights, particularly that of
reasonable use. In 1848, the Georgia Supreme Court clearly rejected the "natural flow"
theory of riparian rights in favor of the "reasonable use" theory. 31 Under the natural flow
theory, "[elach riparian owner on a waterbody is entitled to have the water flow across the
land in its natural condition, without alternation by others of the rate of flow, or the
quantity or quality of the water. ' 32 The rationale for the Court's adoption of the reasonable
use theory of riparian rights is spelled out in Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co.33
If the general rule that each riparian owner could not in any way interrupt or
diminish the flow of the stream were strictly followed, the water would be of but
29 Schrenko v. DeKalb County School Dist., 276 Ga. 786, 791 (2003).
30 However, it may not matter that this issue is not addressed directly in the code if a reviewing
court were to find that the Tenure 1 are qualitatively different than other tenures of permits. A court
may, in reviewing the law, determine that Tenure 1 permits are protected from modifications flowing
from allocation decisions. There are plausible interpretations of Georgia law that could justify such a
finding. Of course, other interpretations of Georgia law might undermine such a finding.
31 Henrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241 (1848).
32 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(c) (Amy K. Kelly ed., repl. vol. 2007).
33 64 S.E. 87 (1909).
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little practical use to any proprietor, and the enforcement of such rule would deny,
rather than grant, the use thereof.34
The Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed its preference for reasonable use in a 1980 case
involving irrigation, Pyle v. Gilbert.35 The Supreme Court made clear in Pyle that "each
riparian proprietor is entitled to a reasonable use of the water, for domestic, agricultural
and manufacturing purposes, provided, that in making such use, he does not work a
material injury to other proprietors." The Georgia Supreme Court, however, provided little
in the way of specifics as to what constituted a "material injury" or the competing demands
of Georgia's many water users should be balanced. Indeed, the Pyle court, in remanding the
case to a lower court, simply said that the lower court should be "looking always to see if,
insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, all the uses of the creek and pond can be
accommodated." 36
And what if they cannot? A trial court grappling with this issue made the following
observation: "Water rights are becoming more and more important with advancing
techniques for its withdrawal and use, and there is a need for the courts or the legislature,
or both, to further amplify and clarify equitable water rights between parties, particularly
as those rights apply to irrigation. ' 37 We whole-heartedly agree. In addition, the EPD could
be included, along with the courts and the legislature, as a party capable of providing water
users with that much needed clarity.
In summary, there is uncertainty and ambiguity as to whether the state can modify or
revoke an agricultural water use permit under existing statutes. Further, it is also unclear
how the tenure status of a permit matters in such an action. Worse yet, water users are left
with an indefinite understanding of their real rights to water when they need it most,
under drought conditions.
III. Flint River Basin Regional Water Development and Conservation Plan
This section focuses on EPD's plan for the Flint River Basin. All regional water plans are
required by law to be consistent with the statewide water plan, which was to be presented
by the EPD to the Georgia Water Council on June 28, 2007.38 The requirement for
statewide planning had little impact on the development of the Flint River Basin Regional
Water Development and Conservation Plan (Flint Plan),39 however, because the Flint Plan
was finalized on March 20, 2006. The Georgia Comprehensive Statewide Water
Management Plan was approved on January 8, 2008, so adjustments to the Flint Plan may
need to be made in the future.
3 4 Id. at 88.
35 245 Ga. 403 (1980).
36 Id. at 411.
37 Id. at 404 n.3.
38 Detailed information about the Georgia statewide planning process is available at
http ://www.georgiawatercouncil.org/.
39 GA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION, FLINT RIVER BASIN REGIONAL
WATER DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION PLAN (Mar. 20, 2006) available at
http)://wwwl.gadnr.org/frbp/Assets/Documents/Plan22.pdf (last visited June 11, 2009).
32 Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2009)
The Flint Plan incorporates the results of significant hydrological modeling of the Flint
River Basin, with particular attention given to two, "vulnerable" sub-basins:
Ichawaynochaway 4 and Spring Creek.4 1 As a very general statement, the Flint Plan calls
for new conservation measures and aggressive management of water resources, measures
which could result in significant cut-backs. The Flint Plan suggests that the EPD plans to
reduce irrigated acreage in these basins during periods of drought with reliance on the
drought protection auction. For example, the Flint Plan states that "some parts of the lower
[Flint River Basin (the sub-basins noted above)] have already reached their drought-year
'safe yield.' If more withdrawal permits are issued for the lower [Flint River Basin], more
aggressive drought-year management strategies will have to be employed, mostly (if not
exclusively) in those parts of the Basin closest to their safe yield. ' 42 Furthermore,
If irrigation is decreased during a drought year by 20% of current use in
Ichawaynochaway Creek and Lower Flint River 43 sub-basins, critical low-flow
criteria will be met. If irrigation is decreased during a drought year in the Spring
Creek sub-basin by 20%, it is assumed this will have a beneficial affect [sic] on water
levels and stream ecology even though critical low-flow criteria may not be met.4 4
Not surprisingly, the inconsistency and uncertainties noted are found in the Flint Plan. In
the plan's discussion of how EPD purports to follow several statutory requirements, the
EPD makes the following statements, among others:
" "All legitimate requests for farm use permits must be granted in the [Flint River
Basin] once the Plan is adopted."
" "EPD may issue permits for less than the amount requested by the permit
applicant."
" "In issuing new permits, EPD may decrease the permitted withdrawal amounts
of all other permitted users including 'grandfathered' permits."
" "EPD may initiate provisions of the Flint River Drought Protection Act during
severe drought years in an effort to maintain critical stream flow."
" "EPD cannot revoke permits for non-use once initial use has commenced. '45
While the EPD's cursory listing of Georgia's statutory requirements does not provide much
in the way of concrete details, it does highlight what appear to be guiding principles and a
glimpse at how the EPD will treat permit holders during times of drought. The Flint Plan
suggests that the EPD fully anticipates that permit holders will give way to new applicants
if an applicant proposes a use that is more "legitimate" than those holding permits.
However, where that line will be drawn and what makes one use of water more "legitimate"
40 USGS Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) 03130009.
41 USGS Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) 03130010.
42 Flint River Plan, supra note 8, at § 2.5.
43 In this case, the Flint Plan refers to the Lower Flint sub-basin, USGS HUC 03130008. However,
elsewhere in the plan, the "Lower Flint River Basin" refers to the lower portion of the entire Flint
Basin including sub-basins Ichawaynochaway, Spring Creek, Kinchafoonee-Muckalee, Lower Flint,
and Middle Flint.
44 Flint River Plan, supra note 8, at § 2.8(4).
45 Id. at 52.
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than another is left unsaid. At least in some respects then, these guiding principles raise
more questions than they answer and compound the uncertainty of rights that exists in the
code.
These principles provide a general, albeit undefined, trajectory of the EPD's intention to
reduce the rights of incumbent users in times of scarcity. Like the statutory provisions, the
Flint Plan includes other text that introduces even more confusion into the mix.
Notwithstanding the EPD's observation that "more aggressive management strategies" may
be required with the increase in water use permits in the Flint River Basin and the
assertion that Georgia law allows the EPD to decrease the permitted withdrawal amount of
all existing permitted users, the plan states that
In considering new and existing applications for both ground-water and surface-
water withdrawals, EPD will evaluate the effect of the proposed water use on
existing users and stream flow, and issue the new permit in such a way that the new
permit will not adversely impact stream flow or the water available to existing
users.
46
Taken literally, this language would require the EPD to refuse permit requests that impact
current users. It is hard to square this language with the seemingly contradictory statutory
requirement, noted in the plan by the EPD, to make room for new permits by decreasing
"permitted withdrawal amounts of all other permitted users including 'grandfathered'
permits. ' 47 This contradiction makes it very difficult to say what the EPD's plan actually is.
It also seems to increase the legal risk that a court will find the Flint Plan legally
impermissible. If the plan was ever challenged in court, the EPD would likely be given
much deference, but this internal conflict would not particularly help the EPD's case. 48
Additional provisions in the Flint Plan that water users may find relevant include the
following:
" The EPD will no longer issue permits for proposed Floridan aquifer irrigation
wells that are within 0.25 miles of another user's well (unless hydrogeologic
evaluation indicates that the proposed well will not cause excessive drawdown in
the other's well).
" Regardless of their location, all proposed Floridan aquifer wells will be evaluated
for their effect on nearby streams and springs. Proposed irrigation wells that
would draw from the Floridan aquifer within 0.5 miles of an in-channel spring or
stream exhibiting a demonstrable connection with the Floridan aquifer will not
be permitted if evaluation indicates that, for the stream reach closest to the
46 Id. at 32.
47 Id. at 52.
48 A discussion about the deference paid to agencies administering the Legislature's commands can
be found in Cummings, supra note 3, at Appendix A, Section II. The Working Paper also discusses
plausible outcomes of a court attempting to interpret these seemingly conflicting provisions of the
Flint Plan.
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proposed well, the well would lower the Floridan aquifer water level to below the
average stream state or decrease the discharge of the spring.
In addition to restrictions on end-guns and other conservation requirements,
newly issued surface water withdrawal permits in Spring Creek and
Ichawaynochaway sub-basins are required to have low-flow protection plans,
requiring a complete cessation of irrigation when discharge at the withdrawal
location falls below 25% of the average annual discharge as calculated at the
point based on the period of record for the nearest downstream continuous flow
gauge, plus a prorated portion of the permitted amount of downstream users.
While the Plan states that affected individuals will be notified by the EPD via e-
mail or phone call when these conditions exist, the Plan also requires that the
permit conditions be followed regardless of whether the permittee has been
contacted by the EPD or not.49
As a part of the EPD's mandate to establish a "reasonable system of classification," the
Flint Plan establishes three categories of small (HUC- 12) watersheds. Such watersheds are
relevant to the EPD's permitting actions and management plans. "Where necessary, and/or
where data are available, permitting and management decisions will take into account site-
specific conditions and local stream impacts down to a HUC-12 watershed scale. ' 50 These
HUC-12 based areas are classified as follows:
Capacity Use Areas: includes watersheds in the Spring Creek Sub-Basin in
which hydrologic models indicate decreased baseflow of more than 5 cubic feet per
second (cfs) in any month of a drought year, more than 10 cfs in Ichawaynochaway
Creek Sub-Basin, and more than 30 cfs in the Lower Flint Sub-Basin.
Restricted Use Areas: includes watersheds in Spring Creek where hydrologic
models indicate decreased baseflow of 1-5 cfs in any month of a drought year, 1-10
cfs in Ichawaynochaway Creek Sub-Basin, and 3-30 cfs in the Lower Flint River
Sub-Basin.
Conservation Use Areas: includes watersheds in which hydrologic models
indicate decreased baseflow of less than 1 cfs in any month of a drought year in
Spring Creek and Ichawaynochaway Creek Sub-Basins and less than 3 cfs in the
Lower Flint River Sub-Basin.
The area classifications are designed to assist in targeting management actions within the
watershed, including the suspension of water withdrawals. The relevance of these
provisions is discussed in the next section.
In summary, the EPD's plan for the Flint River Basin echoes and adds to the statutory
provisions concerning water management. Moreover, it compounds the uncertainty about
the security of water rights and how future water management actions will affect existing
and future water users, especially in the Flint River Basin.
49 It seems to us that this provision will be very difficult to implement and/or enforce.
50 Flint River Plan, supra note 8, at 30.
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IV. The Flint River Drought Protection Act
The Georgia General Assembly enacted the Flint River Drought Protection Act during the
2000 legislative session and revised it during the 2006 legislative session. The basic
purpose of the Act was to provide the EPD with a mechanism for reducing acreage under
irrigation in the Flint River Basin during periods of severe drought. The Flint River
Drought Protection Act has several key features. First, in order to activate the statutory
provisions of the Act, the Director of the EPD must declare a "severe drought" for the
upcoming summer by the first of March. 51 In making this finding, the Director can rely on
historical, mathematical, and meteorological indicators. Second, if the Director declares a
drought, then he or she must also determine the acreage that must be taken out of
irrigation to protect the Flint River. 52 Third, the Director then oversees an "auction-like"
process designed to reduce use of the Flint River in accordance with EPD's previous acreage
reduction determination. The auction is a voluntary program wherein farmers agree to not
irrigate for the balance of that year in exchange for a given amount of money (per acre). 53
Fourth, if the Director is unable to acquire the target acreage in the auction, permitted
irrigation may be involuntarily suspended for the year on a last-in/first-out basis; i.e.,
permits with the most recent issuance date would be suspended first, with the EPD then
working backwards through the permit application dates until the target acreage reduction
is achieved. 54
Funding for the Act, which is critical both for the auction and for the involuntary
suspensions as set forth by the Act, is "guaranteed" only through the following statement of
legislative intent:
The General Assembly intends for the total maximum balance of the unexpended
drought protection funds during any fiscal year not to exceed $30 million. In the
event the total balance of unexpended drought protection funds at the end of a fiscal
year is less than $5 million, it is the intent of the General Assembly that the total
balance of unexpended drought protection funds be replenished to at least $10
million at the earliest possible time.55
The EPD issued a number of rules that added some detail to the basic structure of the Flint
River Drought Protection Act. 56 Perhaps the most fundamental addition to the Act were the
rules that determine eligibility for participation in the auction 57 and the rules that exclude
51 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-546(a).
52 Id. § 12-5-546(b).
53 Id.
54 Id. § 12-5-547.
55 Id. §12-5-541 (emphasis added). Given the potentially high costs of implementing the auction and
Georgia's increasingly urban population, it is simply not clear what fund replenishment "at the
earliest possible time" might mean to the growing number of legislators representing these urban
areas.
56 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. Chapter 319-3-28 (Flint River Drought Protection).
57 Id. 391-3-28.05(b).
36 Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2009)
permittees who applied for permits after December 1, 1999 from potential involuntary
suspension. 58
This exclusion has dramatic potential implications for Tenure 1 farmers. Only farmers with
pre-December 1, 1999 application dates are subject to the auction proceedings and, more
importantly, involuntary suspension of their irrigation permits. This exclusion appears to
detract from the legislative intent of the Act, which was to provide protection to farmers
with more senior tenures of permits. Instead, under the EPD rules, Tenure 1 permittees are
protected from involuntary reductions in irrigated acreage only to the extent that they can
be accommodated by focusing involuntary reductions on permittees with application dates
between July 1, 1988 and December 1, 1999.
The first auction under the Act was held in March 2001. That summer, more than 33,000
acres of Lower Flint River Basin were voluntarily suspended. During the 2002 auction,
approximately 41,000 acres were voluntarily suspended. Since the lifting of the permit
moratorium in March 2006, new withdrawal permits have been and are being issued.
Processing the backlog of over 1,100 permit applications that accumulated during the
moratorium could result in new permits for up to 100,000 irrigated acres. 59 In addition, the
EPD may now consider applications for new permits. In the Flint River Basin, both the
backlog permits and the newly issued permits are excluded from involuntary suspension or
revocation due to over-allocation or drought under the Act.60 As new withdrawals are
permitted, the protection that the last-in/first-out provision of the Drought Protection Act
provides to Tenure 1 permittees becomes severely limited.6 1
The EPD has also issued a number of rules that flesh out how it might target particular
areas in the Flint River Basin in order to meet its water management objectives. These
rules allow it to target "affected areas" for auction, specifically providing that it can focus on
specific watersheds and groundwater permits "within 3 miles adjacent to the Flint River or
its tributaries where . ..withdrawals may directly decrease stream flow. ' 62 This focused
approach, while perhaps smart from a policy standpoint, only increases the possibility that
more senior tenured permittees will be affected by future EPD involuntary suspensions.
As discussed above in Section III, the EPD has stated the agency's intention in the Flint
River Plan to reduce withdrawals during a drought by 20% in the "vulnerable sub-basins"
of the Ichawaynochaway and Spring Creek. To appreciate how the EPD's approach may
impact water users, some data has been compiled for illustrative purposes in Tables 2
58 Id. 319-3-28.09 (read in light of"Permittee" as defined in 319-3-29.02).
59 Flint River Plan, supra note 8, at 41, Table 1.1.
60 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-543(b)([1)(A) provides that only permits with application dates prior to
December 1, 1999 can participate in the Drought Protection auction. Note, however, that outside of
the Drought Protection Act, new permits (Tenure 5) for surface water use in the Spring Creek and
Ichawaynochaway Creek sub-basins are interruptible without compensation (see Flint River Plan,
supra note 8, at 35), and it would seem that restrictions on new groundwater permits for taking
water from the Floridan aquifer will be much more restrictive than in the past. Id. at 23.
61 Due to the dramatic change the exclusion of new permittees has created for implementation of the
Flint River Basin Drought Protection Act, it might not hold up if challenged in court. This issue is
addressed in additional detail in Cummings, supra note 3, at 52-57.
62 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-28.05(a).
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through 6.63 As Table 2 shows, Ichawaynochaway has 394 surface water permits with
62,429 permitted acres and 468 groundwater permits with 63,691 permitted acres. The
EPD's Flint River Plan and subsequent rule changes give particular emphasis to concern
with water use within a 3-mile "buffer" along Ichawaynochaway Creek. Surface and
groundwater acreage included in this 3-mile buffer and acreage in the three area
classifications (Capacity Use, Restricted Use, and Conservation Use) are also provided in
the table. As Table 3 shows, Spring Creek has 96 surface water permits with 12,897
permitted acres and 1,077 groundwater permits with 137,055 permitted acres.
Table 2: Water Use Permits: Ichawaynochaway Sub-Basin
Total Number of Permits Permitted Acreage
Surface water 394 62,429
Surface water, within 3-mile buffer 285 49,430
Capacity 15 1,265
Restricted 11 6,209
Conservation 259 41,956
Groundwater 468 63,691
Groundwater, within 3-mile buffer 296 38,849
Capacity 70 7229
Restricted 7 590
Conservation 219 31,030
Table 3: Water Use Permits: Spring Creek Sub-Basin
Total Number of Permits Permitted Acreage
Surface water 96 12,897
Surface water, within 3-mile buffer 85 11,210
Capacity 8 703
Restricted 9 1,030
Conservation 68 9,477
Groundwater 1,077 137,055
Groundwater, within 3-mile buffer 1,000 127,427
Capacity 261 31,340
Restricted 291 36,105
Conservation 448 50,082
It is unclear whether the EPD's stated policy of reducing withdrawals in these two sub-
basins by 20% during periods of drought refers to total permitted acreage or only to acreage
within the 3-mile buffer zone. If the 20% reduction were based on total acreage, the EPD
would need to retire 25,224 acres in Ichawaynochaway and 29,990 acres in Spring Creek for
a total of 55,214 acres. If the 20% reduction was limited to lands within the 3-mile buffer,
the EPD would need to retire 17,656 acres in Ichawaynochaway and 27,727 acres in Spring
Creek for a total of 45,383 acres. It is interesting to note that during the 2002 auction, only
8,277 of Ichawaynochaway's 49,430 permitted surface water acreage and 3,013 of Spring
Creek's 11,210 permitted surface water acreage in the 3-mile buffer zone were voluntarily
63 Data shown were compiled using ESRI ArcGIS based on the agricultural water withdrawal permit
database as of December 2006. The data were made available to the authors by the Georgia EPD.
Given the dynamic nature of the database involved, it is anticipated that some minor changes have
occurred in the numbers since the analyses were performed.
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suspended. Thus, the acquisition of more than 45,000 acres in these sub-basins is likely to
require prices well in excess of the $150.00/acre offer price used in the 2002 auction.
If the area classifications are not relevant, the EPD could obtain its targeted acreage
entirely from surface permits.64 However, if suspension decisions are based on the
classifications, the implications for Tenure 1 permittees are substantial. Consider, for
example, the Ichawaynochaway Creek Sub-Basin.65 Virtually all surface water permits in
the Capacity and Restricted Use areas and more than 85% of surface water permits in the
Conservation Use areas are Tenure 1 permits. 66 Obtaining targeted acreage solely from
surface water would necessarily require that large acreages of Tenure 1 permits be
voluntarily or involuntarily suspended. With the addition of groundwater permits, as
shown in Tables 4 through 6, the bulk of permits in the Capacity and Restricted Use area
classifications, those most likely to be suspended, are still in the hands of Tenure 1 farmers.
Similar conditions are found in the Spring Creek Sub-Basin. As a result, the bulk of
permits to be retired, either voluntarily through the auction or involuntarily suspended,
would have to come from Tenure 1 farmers.
Table 4: Ichawaynochaway: Auction-eligible Permits within Capacity Use Classification.
Permits Within 3-mile Buffer
Surface water Groundwater
Year number number
permit of acreage cumulative % total of acreage cumulative % total
issued permits acreage permits acreage
1988 1 103 103 1
1989 5 284 284 22 2 162 265 4
1990 4 338 622 49 12 1,237 1,502 21
1991 1 99 721 57 12 1,313 2,815 39
1992 5 544 1205 100 24 2,692 5,507 76
1993 1205 100 5,507 76
1994 1205 100 5,507 76
1995 1205 100 1 154 5,661 78
1996 1205 100 5,661 78
1997 1205 100 1 50 5,711 79
1998 1205 100 5,711 79
1999 1205 100 1 114 5,825 81
2000 1205 100 13 1,184 7,009 97
2001 1205 100 2 165 7,174 99
2002 1205 100 1 55 7,229 100
2003 1205 100 7,229 100
64 It seems reasonable to assume that the EPD would
retirement would have a larger and more certain
suspension of groundwater permits.
look first to surface permits given that their
effect on surface water supplies than the
65 Note that Tables 4 through 6 assume that EPD would seek to attain a 20% reduction in permitted
withdrawals only within the 3-mile buffer.
66 It is important to note that grandfathered permits include those for which applications were
submitted prior to July 1, 1991 and were based on water use that had taken place prior to July 1,
1988. Tables 4 through 6 list the issuance date of permits, but not the application date. Application
date data were not available. The EPD had a backlog of applications of Tenure 1 permits which took
several years to process. For the purposes of this analysis, we estimate that most permits issued in
1995 or before are Tenure permits, but it is possible that some were issued even later than 1995.
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Table 5: Ichawaynochaway: Auction-eligible Permits within Restricted Use Classification
Permits Within 3-mile Buffer
Surface water Ground water
Year number number
permit of acreage cumulative % total of acreage cumulative % total
issued permits acreage permits acreage
1988
1989 6 4,719 4719 76
1990 4719 76 1 57 57 10
1991 2 1,306 6025 97 6 533 590 100
1992 1 103 6128 99 590 100
1993 6128 99 590 100
1994 6128 99 590 100
1995 6128 99 590 100
1996 6128 99 590 100
1997 6128 99 590 100
1998 6128 99 590 100
1999 6128 99 590 100
2000 2 81 6209 100 590 100
2001 6209 100 590 100
2002 6209 100 590 100
2003
Table 6: Ichawaynochaway: Auction-eligible Permits within Conservation Use
Classification.
Permits Within 3-mile Buffer
Surface water Ground water
Year number number
permit of acreage cumulative % total of acreage cumulative % total
issued permits acreage permits acreage
1988 11 2,293 2293 5 13 2,554 2,554 8
1989 82 14,292 16585 40 35 6,115 8,669 28
1990 45 6,374 22959 55 33 5,437 14,106 45
1991 75 11,403 34362 82 58 7,259 21,365 69
1992 7 905 35267 84 17 2,145 23,510 76
1993 2 473 35740 85 23,510 76
1994 2 668 36408 87 1 101 23,701 76
1995 3 483 36891 88 1 187 23,888 77
1996 1 44 36935 88 1 182 24,070 78
1997 1 150 37085 88 2 188 24,258 78
1998 2 230 37315 89 3 400 24,718 80
1999 37315 89 2 215 24,993 80
2000 22 3,832 41147 98 43 5,176 30,109 97
2001 2 412 41559 99 5 526 30,635 99
2002 3 346 41905 100 4 389 31,024 100
2003 1 51 41956 100 1 6 31,030 100
Georgia law is silent on the question as to what will happen in the event that a drought is
not declared on March 1, but in fact occurs after that date. There are no provisions for a
post-March 1 declaration that would trigger an acreage reduction auction. In such a
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scenario, if the EPD finds that acreage reduction is required to protect the river,
involuntary suspension would seem to be their only recourse. That possibility raises a
number of questions. Whose acreage would be suspended? What procedures would be
adopted by the EPD in implementing any required suspensions in the absence of the
Drought Protection Act process? If a drought is not declared, the EPD might rely on its
more general authority to modify permits, discussed above in Section 111. If so, that leaves
water users with substantial uncertainty. 67
V. Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, two questions of paramount importance to Georgia's
farming sector were posed. First, can the EPD modify, revoke, or in any way alter water use
permits during periods of drought? Second, does the tenure of a permit affect the
permittee's vulnerability to any such modification or revocation? State law, EPD
regulations, and case law provide only ambiguous answers to these questions.
Permittees may not have the clear rights to water that they believe that they have. Their
rights are riddled with legal uncertainties. A dilemma is emerging in the Georgia water law
regime. As the state tries to comport with the principles of riparian rights, conditions of
scarcity, such as during a drought, make such a commitment untenable. Existing laws
leave the EPD in a "damned if they do; damned if they don't" position. The EPD faces a
certain amount of litigation risk no matter how it attempts to reconcile the laws of the state
with respect to water use management. Moreover, as conditions of scarcity become more
frequent, the risk of litigation will only increase.
This article does not advocate the adoption of a prior appropriation system for the state of
Georgia. Nor does it in fact advocate any particular solution to the uncertainties found in
Georgia's water law. However, it calls for support for the clarification of the law to reduce
uncertainty about future access to water for permit holders. The riparian doctrine, as
traditionally applied, is not well suited for guiding water use under conditions of scarcity.
Modifications are needed to clarify the rights and responsibilities of permittees during
periods of drought or pronounced demand. The state needs to rationalize its water laws in
order to eliminate inconsistencies in its current laws and to clarify legislative intent as to
how water resources are to be managed. Under the current framework, too much is left to
chance and is almost virtually certain to lead to costly and protracted litigation.
67 It is important to note that in addition to the uncertainty raised by the statutory and regulatory
language, any number of the provisions of the Drought Protection Act, such as those related to a
farmer's property right in a permit, may be subject to challenge in the courts. The basis for such a
challenge could be a provision of the Georgia Constitution which does not permit amendment of laws
of general application by "special" laws. Article VI, IV(a) of the Constitution states that "Laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall
be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, except that the
General Assembly may by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution
to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws." A reviewing court relying on this
provision could find that at least portions of the Flint River Drought Protection Act are "special"
laws, which cannot amend more general laws such as Georgia's surface water and groundwater laws.
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Along these lines, Georgia may wish to consider the need to quantify the amount of water
that a permittee is entitled to withdraw. To date, agricultural withdrawal permits in
Georgia have not specified this amount. Other riparian states, such as Oregon and Texas,
have taken such action when they began to grapple with conditions of scarcity, similar to
what Georgia is now experiencing.68 In these states, riparians property owners were given a
fixed amount of time to provide documentation of their water use over the previous four-to-
five years, and these data were used to quantify their riparian rights. Existing permits
issued by the EPD already specify the acreage that can be irrigated under the permit.
Therefore, to implement this recommendation an additional datum simply needs to be
added to the permit. Quantified rights under a water use permit offers several advantages,
including supporting the EPD in reducing water use during a drought on an (arguably)
"fair" basis. For example, all users could be required to reduce water use by 10% of their
permitted amount. These limits would be enforceable once the state's program to install
meters on all agricultural wells, which is projected to be completed in 2009, comes on-line.
In conclusion, several closely related questions are posed that can help facilitate discussion
among policymakers and stakeholders in the state. Responses to these questions could help
to guide the development of substantive improvements in the state's water laws.
1) Should the state continue to allow expansion of irrigated acreage in basins like the Flint
River Basin where over-appropriation (during periods of drought) is already a reality?
If yes, then the state would be well advised to initiate plans for how they might respond to
the likelihood of litigation claiming the state's abrogation of its obligations to downstream
states. If no, the state would benefit from the provision of explicit guidance to the EPD as to
restraints on the issuance of new permits.
2) Closely related to the above, do we want a system wherein any riparian owner can
obtain a right to water use, even if this means that existing water users must reduce
their established use?
If yes, then the law needs to provide more explicit guidance on how existing permits can be
modified to accommodate new users. Should each permit holder, regardless of permitted
acreage, cede the same amount of water which will, in total, offset the water use of the new
permit application? Is the reduction pro-rated on a per-permitted-acre basis? Does the
tenure of a permit affect the amount of reduction required; i.e., does the holder of a permit
issued in the 1980s give up the same or a lesser amount that the holder of a permit issued
in the 1990s? Is there a limit on the riparian claim of a new applicant; i.e., can a new
applicant assert a riparian claim for water required to irrigate thousands of acres? Will
compensation be given to existing permit holders pushed aside for new users?
68 See RONALD G. CUMMINGS, NANCY A. NORTON, AND VIRGIL A. NORTON, GEORGIA WATER PLANNING
AND POLICY CENTER, ENHANCING IN-STREAM FLOWS IN THE FLINT RIVER BASIN: DOES GEORGIA HAVE
SUFFICIENT POLICY TOOLS?, Water Policy Working Paper #2001-002 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.h2opolicycenter.org/pdf documents/water workingpapers/2001 002.pdf (last visited June
30, 2009).
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If no, then existing provisions that require that the EPD issue new permits for irrigation
and sections of the law cited above that require modification of existing permits to
accommodate new applicants should be changed.
3) Should the state give any sort of preferential treatment to different tenures of permits;
i.e., does a farmer who has had a permit for twenty-plus years have the same standing
in any acreage reduction scheme as one who acquired a permit later? Related to this
question, should holders of permits obtained after December 1, 1999 be excluded from
the Flint River Drought Protection Act irrigation suspension auction and provisions for
the involuntary suspension of permits?
If the answer to the first question is yes, then explicit language to this effect in Georgia's
water laws would resolve ambiguity created by conflicting requirements to accommodate
new users and to protect existing permit holders. If the answer is no, then explicit language
to this effect would remove a great deal of uncertainty from Georgia's water laws.
4) Similarly, should the law provide more explicit guidance as to how the EPD should
attain irrigation reductions when the Drought Protection Act is not invoked but drought
conditions exist (i.e., when a drought is not declared by March 1 and severe drought
conditions follow or if acreage reductions attained voluntarily by auction under the Act
later prove to be inadequate)?
If yes, then the law should provide specific guidelines for the identification of farmers
whose permits may be suspended. It must make clear whether the tenure of a permit
"counts" in this regard. If the answer is no, then, it would still be helpful if at least the rules
used by the EPD were made more explicit. Prior to adoption, any rule changes should be
fully debated by affected stakeholders.
5) Should the state begin the process of quantifying amounts of water use allowed under
an issued water use permit?
If yes, then policymakers should give consideration to the process that they wish the EPD
to follow in quantifying permitted water use. If no, then, obviously, no action is required.
While considering these important questions, policymakers must also consider the external
context for these concerns. In this case, the external context tends to further muddy the
waters. First, federal laws add a new layer of complexity and uncertainty. The continuing
conflict among Georgia, Alabama, and Florida concerning waters in the Appalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint Basin (ACF) could result in federal actions, such as an equitable
apportionment action, that could unpredictably affect water resource allocation in the
region. The federal Endangered Species Act is also relevant given the presence of multiple
federally listed species in the watershed, including endangered freshwater mussels and
Gulf sturgeon. Other possible challenges to the rights of Georgia water users could arise
based on the Clean Water Act or provisions of state common law, such as the public trust
doctrine. In significant respects, those watching developments in Georgia water law are
waiting for the proverbial "other shoe" to drop and potentially turn Georgia's treatment of
water rights completely on its head. A potential interstate challenge to Georgia's
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management of the Flint Basin or the larger ACF based on federal law adds additional
uncertainty to Flint Basin permittees rights to use water.
Second, Georgia is currently developing a new statewide water plan to guide its
management of water resources across the state. The draft plan was presented to the
Georgia Water Council in the summer of 2007, and passed by the state legislature during
its 2008 session. The plan suggests a number of new policies for water resource
management in the state. Perhaps the most significant with respect to the issues discussed
in this article is the proposal to manage watersheds based on "consumptive use
assessments," which aim to allocate available water to various users, in-stream flows,
downstream needs, and assimilative capacity with clear numerical targets. Additionally,
the plan proposes the use of regional entities to coordinate water management planning at
the sub-state level. A shift to regional management of watersheds could significantly
change water policy in this state, but it also might not. Until the details of implementation
are known, the impact is uncertain. Thus, the new statewide plan could change the
direction of current state water policy, and therefore, while the plan and its implementation
details are still incomplete, water users face additional uncertainty over how future water
management and allocation policies will affect them.
Georgia water policy is at a crossroads. This article is offered as a starting point for
assessing the current water statutes and regulations that affect agricultural water users in
Georgia. This analysis suggests that the current policies are confusing, even contradictory.
Moreover, they do not appear to be up to the task of addressing current conditions of
scarcity, and they create uncertainty for permit holders over what actual rights they have
to water to support their farm operations.
Georgia is currently endeavoring to develop revised policies to manage water resources in
the state. As it does, discussion of these issues should be central. If the state does not
address these issues soon, it will face decisions that are more difficult and choices that are
more constrained, and if it waits too long, decisions may be made for it in a court of law.
